WMD fun from just 12 years ago!

 

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Extra txt to 27 June 2003
Posted 28 June 2003

This text (as found on CNN) is beautiful text, the text speaks for itself. Just read it.
The American are still 'convinced' they will find all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, one could classify this kind of behavior as 'very stubborn' but much more 'mental things' are into their heads. One could say that the entire American government has SADS (= Severe American Disease Syndrome) where the American Disease is being very deaf, blind and stupid all at the same time. 
When you have American Disease for over 10 years this condition is called SADS.   

Of course it is rather understandable that the Americans hold on to their version of the truth as long as possible. Because if in the end it is found that their 'worst nightmare scenario' surfaces (meaning that only just after Gulf War I there were a little WMD but later nothing anymore) than they have a very terrible problem at hand.
Isn't it a fact of life that a rough million Iraqis did die from the sanctions? And if we find in 2003 or in 2004 that all the time there was no WMD what to do then? Just think at those mind buggling numbers, a full million that is one sixth of the 'most famous number' in history.

Also if this lack of WMD is true, this could explain why the Iraqis are rather pissed at the invading armies. And if the WMD bogus is true it is also clear that whatever the coalition forces do it will never ever be right in the eyes of the Iraqis. Or am I now unreasonable?

 

U.S. nearly ignored Iraqi nuclear scientist, intermediary says

From Maria Fleet
CNN 

Friday, June 27, 2003 Posted: 8:17 PM EDT (0017 GMT).


(CNN) -- The high-ranking Iraqi nuclear scientist who led U.S. officials to hidden centrifuge blueprints and components told CNN he was detained by the Army despite the fact that he was already cooperating with the CIA, and the intermediary who facilitated his contact with the U.S. government said he was initially ignored.

Mahdi Obeidi, who headed Iraq's gas centrifuge program for enriching uranium before the Persian Gulf War, said he hid the parts in his garden 12 years ago under orders from Saddam Hussein's son Qusay and Saddam's then-son-in-law, Hussein Kamel.

Obeidi said he decided to cooperate with the United States days after American troops entered Baghdad but said he was afraid to talk to U.S. soldiers.

He instead approached international journalists at random outside the well- known Palestine Hotel in the Iraqi capital until he was able to convince one to contact David Albright, a former weapons inspector he had met in the 1990s.

Albright, who heads the Institute for Science and International Security, a nuclear nonproliferation institute in Washington, said he talked to various agencies for a week before the CIA became interested in interviewing the scientist.

U.S. officials initially did not understand the significance of Obeidi's offer, Albright said.

"I have never seen anything like it. Obeidi is sending all sorts of signals, and they just missed it completely," Albright said. "They were going to walk away from him."

Obeidi said: "After David made the first contact, I told them that I had very important information at my disposal. I told them about the intentions and the presence of designs, of documents and of a critical component."

Once U.S. agents realized the potential significance of his offer, "they were really filled with joy that such a thing could happen," he said.

"I told them my only concern is about myself and my family and that this matter needs to be taken with utmost care, and they promised me that this matter would be the greatest concern to them."

Despite those assurances, on June 3, two days after he turned the nuclear components and documents over to the CIA, the U.S. Army broke down the door of his home and took him away.

"They took me outside, and they handcuffed me. I saw tens of soldiers and tens of tanks and Hummers and helicopters were all around," Obeidi said. "And then I was taken to the side, and I was put on one of these Hummers ... and they took me to the airport."

The U.S. military is using the Baghdad airport to hold detainees.

Obeidi was held for a day before the problem was straightened out, he said.

David Kay, the CIA's new chief weapons inspector in Iraq, blamed the mistake on a lack of coordination between the many units operating in the country.

"We're taking steps to ensure we're all singing off the same sheet of music," Kay said. "Coordination is essential to the effort we're engaged in, and we have learned from our mistakes."

U.S. Central Command apologized in a statement. "Mr. Mahdi Obeidi's detainment was unfortunate, and we are working with other agencies in Iraq to avoid this happening in the future," the statement said. "Central Command appreciates Mr. Obeidi's cooperation with the U.S. government and the coalition."

Once released, Obeidi resumed his meetings with CIA personnel, whom he said he believed had agreed to move him and his family out of the country for protection in return for handing over the documents and designs. But he said he then began to think that the CIA was going back on its word.

"First they have promised that they will make all the attempts to safeguard me ... and then what happened they told me that they have looked and they have investigated this matter, and they have discovered that there is more that I can offer, and they are ready to take the news to the media," he recalled.

Albright advised Obeidi at that point to go public with his story.

"I think what happened unfortunately is there is no policy in the U.S. government to allow these scientists to come to the U.S.," Albright said. "... There is no plea-bargain policy."

When CNN asked about the scientist's case, the CIA said it was moving Obeidi to a safer place and asked that the network refrain from airing anything until he and his family were out of Iraq.

CNN later interviewed Obeidi under an agreement not to reveal his location. Obeidi in turn had consented with his handlers not to reveal much about his removal from Iraq or future plans.

"I think a scientist is a scientist," Obeidi said. "He is a man that is used for a task, and he is used to do his task well. ... The Iraqi scientists should be treated with respect."

When asked about the lessons learned from the U.S. handling of his case, Obeidi replied, "The scientist is in search of the truth and the scientist should be well handled. Because whatever information he has that could serve the cause of humanity, he should volunteer without having to feel any fear of the consequences of doing it."
 

 

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So is this good reading or not? Again it is observed that it often is very difficult for an individual to talk some truth into the head of entire organizations. For myself speaking I have exactly the same problem, but since I do not feel to grow into some depression I simply put the head of the Dutch secret service op proud (sniper) position nr 002 for a complete 1250 days.
Simple and efficient, and now the mindsets of those Dutch secret service employees will change a bit. Just a bit, it still is important that 'stupid Sjoerd' truly is snipered away but we have 1250 days to enjoy....

Oh oh, didn't the Americans ask for scientists to come out and tell what they know? And when one of those scientists does this, what happens? Can we conclude that the invading forces are by no means up to their tasks or is this a 'too fast' conclusion?

Make up your own mind, don't let your mind get buggled by the 'one million number' because that is only a 'once a decade' joke for the Americans. They have a bit too much power and then you get stuff like that on a more or less regular basis.

Bye.

 

 

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End of extra text.

 

  

Title: Stuff like that on a more or less regular basis?  
      

 

 

 

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